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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Utah State Tax Commission is the body authorized to 
perform duties m relation to assessment, equalization and 
collection oi laxes, "The Issue JII i In LIL-. L nil t. icise, whet In i 
royalties are owed to the State of Utah under applicable law for 
reimbu rsed ad v a ] orem ai id occupation taxes, i s also involved in 
other proceedings on appeal from the "Utah Stale Tax d" mini i ssiun , ! 
The method of assessment and valuation of taxes and rates 
applicable to nnneraJ leases i me I ud i nq oi I, gas and hydrocarbons 
are initially evaluated by personnel within the Utah State Tax 
Commission. As the decision of this Cour t in tl le instant case 
may bind future pol; ; rocedures c f tl re Ami ci is I Jtal State 
Tax Commission lereinafter "Tax Commission") is interested i 11 
the decisi oi i tni s court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I - *!e District Court err in finding that "gross 
va ] it le" as use • li^bjj (repealed, 
1988), and "value" a: .:>•;.' : \ U H ,< ,;i § " - 5 • 6 7 (Currently 
Utah Code Ann. «- :V?-5- 1 0/ ( 1 i ( a *: include ad valorem tax 
reimburseme. .: .-..*. s fo:i : the sa ] e :)f i ts 
Belnorth Petroleum Corporation (Enron'Oil & Gas Company ) v. 
State Tax Commission of Utah, Appeal No. 910290. 
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production and ; finding that such tax reimbursements are 
therefore sul ' • - M L I U H L -
2 3id the District .wuil *. L'I in finding at 
reference to "market value" royalty clauses contained in 
the subject oi1 --; - <- :- J ix 
reimbursements received by Enron for its production i . . 111 
fi ncli ng that si ich reimbursements were therefore subject to 
royalty? 
. >l the District Court err in finding that neither 
'ea--.-: . * • ,5 "lubion of ad valorem tax 
reimbursements a* ~n element of royalty payments or severance 
taxes under Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (1953) (repealed, 1988) and 
§ 59-b i UJ'{ 1 i (d)? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
,
 u t a h c ;t /v; § 65-1-18(2) (a) (1953) f repealed and 
reenacted in part at § 65A A |1")8H), 
• latural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S C. §§ 
3301-3432, spet,.; , J , I y , 1'i U.",C. § 3 3 2 u 
A Utah Property Tax Act, Tl t, 111 \ \;d*» Ann . §§ r,i "^  - 2 -• I 01 
to 1372 (1987 & Supp. 1991); and 
1 ii ! j dS amended 1983) 
(Currently Utah Code Ann, § 59-5-102(1)i .,.^88 & Supp, . »:• M . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case and the synopsis of the 
proceedings below have been ably set forth in the Brief of 
Appellees; State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, and the Director of the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, By minute entry dated 
February 18, 1992 the motion for Utah State Office of Education 
and Utah State Tax Commission to participate Amici Curiae was 
granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DEFINITION OF "VALUE" CAN BE EXPRESSED AS WHAT THE GAS 
PURCHASER'S WERE WILLING TO GIVE APPELLANT IN EXCHANGE FOR 
ITS NATURAL GAS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18(2)(a) (1953, repealed and 
reenacted in part at § 65A-6-4, (1988), (the "Royalty Statute"), 
and Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-67(2)(b)(i) (1953, as amended 1983) 
(the "Occupation Statute"), are similar in the manner in which 
payments are made to the state. The Royalty Statute states in 
part " . . . royalty shall not exceed 12 1/2 percent of the gross 
value of the product at the point of shipment from the leased 
premises." The Occupation Statute stated in part " . . . every 
person engaged in the business . . . shall pay to the state an 
occupation tax equal to 2 percent of the value at the well of the 
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oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances produced, saved, and 
sold or transported from the field where produced . . . ." 
(emphasis added) 
The ordinary and usually accepted meaning of the term 
"value" can be expressed as what the gas purchasers were willing 
to give the Appellant in exchange for its natural gas. Statutes 
should be applied according to their literal wording, and each 
term in the statute should be interpreted and applied according 
to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. 
II. THE AD VALOREM TAX REIMBURSEMENT PROVISIONS ARE ELEMENTS OF 
VALUE THAT WERE EXCHANGED FOR APPELLANT'S NATURAL GAS. 
Each of the Appellant's gas purchase agreements contain 
a tax reimbursement clause requiring the gas purchaser to 
reimburse Appellant for all or a portion of the taxes it pays on 
the production value of its natural gas. As the gas purchase 
agreements make clear, the tax reimbursement provisions were as 
much a consideration received by the Appellant for the contract 
as the price paid for the natural gas itself. 
III. TREATMENT OF TAX REIMBURSEMENTS UNDER THE NGPA DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE THEIR INCLUSION AS AN ELEMENT OF ROYALTY AND 
TAXABLE VALUE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-5-67 and 65-1-18. 
Treatment of tax reimbursements under the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3402 ("NGPA") does not 
preclude their inclusion as an element of taxable value under 
Utah Code Ann- § 65-1-18. Congress' purpose in enacting the NGPA 
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was to alleviate the adverse economic effects of the disparate 
treatment of intrastate and interstate natural gas sales. The 
Tenth Circuit has held that when determining the value of natural 
gas production for royalty purposes, the NGPA does not preclude 
the inclusion of tax reimbursements as an element of value of 
natural gas production. Likewise, the NGPA does not preclude the 
inclusion of tax reimbursements when determining the value of 
production of natural gas for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-
18 or for § 59-5-67 and their successor statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFINITION OF "VALUE" OR "GROSS VALUE" CAN BE EXPRESSED 
AS WHAT THE GAS PURCHASER'S WERE WILLING TO GIVE APPELLANT 
IN EXCHANGE FOR ITS NATURAL GAS. 
In Utah, any person owning an interest in natural gas 
produced from a well in this state must pay occupation tax based 
on a percentage of the value of the natural gas. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-67 (1953 as amended 1983)(Currently Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
102(1)(a)(1988 & Supp. 1991)). The basis for computing the 
occupation tax is as follows: 
In the case of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon 
substances, (except solid hydrocarbons) the value at 
the well shall be the value established under a bona 
fide contract for the purchase of the same or in the 
absence of a contract by the value at the well 
established by the United States for royalty purposes 
in the field from which they are produced, (emphasis 
added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-67(2)(b)(i)(1953 as amended 1983)(Currently 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 (1988 & Supp. 1991)). Therefore, the 
amount of occupation tax due from Appellant's production and 
sales of natural gas is based on the elements of "value" that 
were exchanged between Appellant and its purchasers as evidenced 
by its gas purchase agreements. The Appellees' brief makes the 
equivalent argument for determination of the term "gross value" 
as used in the former royalty statutes (65-1-18(2)(a) as 
amended)• 
After reviewing Appellant's gas purchase contracts, the 
Auditing Division assessed occupation tax on the ad valorem tax 
reimbursements Appellant received because, along with the amount 
designated as a sales price, they were part of the "value" 
established under the purchase agreements. Simply because the 
term "value" is not defined by the statute, the term is not 
necessarily ambiguous. Amicus Tax Commission argues, with 
Appellees, that the term "value" must be given its ordinary and 
usual meaning which includes all forms of compensation received 
by the Appellant in exchange for the sale of its gas. 
This interpretation of Section 59-5-67(2)(b)(i) is 
correct in light of this Court's well established principles of 
statutory construction: 
[A] statute should be applied according to its 
literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable. See Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 
Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967). We must assume 
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that each term in the statute was used advisedly 
by the legislature and that each should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning. Where the ordinary meaning of 
the terms results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in 
blatant contradiction to the express purpose of 
the statute, it is not the duty of this Court to 
assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme. See, 
e.g., Knox v. Thomas, 30 Utah 2d 15, 512 P.2d 664 
(1973); Gord supra. 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). The 
literal wording of Section 59-5-67(2)(b)(i) instructs that the 
elements of "value" under a bona fide contract for the purchase 
of natural gas are what determine the basis upon which to impose 
the occupation taxes. The term "value" must be interpreted 
according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Jlci. In 
determining the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms, 
the dictionary offers guidance. In Re J.D.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, the definition of the term "value" 
is "an amount regarded as a suitable equivalent for something 
else, especially a fair price or return for goods or services. . 
• •" Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary 1275 (1984). 
Moreover, the word "value" may also be defined as market value, 
as used in leases and other contexts, which is normally "the 
highest price a willing buyer would pay [and] a willing seller 
would accept." Blacks Law Dictionary, 501 (5th ed. 1979). Even 
in Appellants' brief, at page 26, it states:* 
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Utah law provides and it was agreed to by the parties 
at the trial court level (Reply Brief at 13; Record at 
139), that value for royalty purposes means that which 
a willing seller will accept and a willing buyer will 
pay for gas. 
The footnote to this passage continues: 
"Fair market value" is defined for purposes of the Utah 
Property Tax Act as "the amount at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and willing 
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts " Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2) (1987 
& Supp. 1991) • 
Therefore, the value of the gas sold pursuant to Appellant's gas 
purchase agreements can be expressed as what the gas purchaser's 
were willing to give Appellant in exchange for its natural gas. 
This Court has held that a statute should not be 
construed in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole. 
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 
1990)(citing Peav v. Board of Education of Provo City Schools, 
377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962)). "Further, '[i]f there is doubt 
or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions 
of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, 
in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in 
accordance with its intent and purpose.'" Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)(quoting Osuala v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 198t)) ) . 
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O c c u p a t i o n t a x e s a r e imposed upon a l ] m e t a l l i f e r o u s 
in I n e x a 3 s • • : -i ] gas • ::>: : ~ i> u^ : r ^ c a r b o n s u b s t a n c e s based - "h^ 
amount r e c e i v e d by t h e p r o d u c e r . Utal 1 Code Ani 1. § 
* t<* mptrj I I i f e r o u t m i n e i , i ;• — a o a t i o n t a x i : :\i*< : 
owne • : •.• - J - : s j t t 
t o o- *:a-'. -t »,^r Mydrocarb'-*. s i b s t a n c e s , o c c u p a t i o n * -: . 
base* . . . 
Utal '^de Ar ' * * * r '. •* ' *.s ^ j i j i ' i i 5 r -
s
 Load d l l - ^ ^ v n r n s r i "~ ' -** ; ^ v * -v 1P'*«. a:.^ 
*;! .- J . J c u r i S . G u i u i i o n r e c e i v e c ,.- i i^ 
n^cupa t: i on t a x e f . •-. (Joes Sec t . n 5 9 - S - -5"' ! > i e * **<" 
.ae u i f f e r i n g 
broa< t e r m s ; S e c t i o n r : ^ - 5 - 6 7 i J <-: ^ . . •, amount <~>f .jiiey 
• r : x - - ** j • * ^ ' - i w d b T ov^nei . ' w h i l e i-ect i -. n 
cont fdv : e c l i j n v***- u —jj qi -^ J , ..e ;i* . ~~ 
t h e ur=gj.siatui>. . ; impose < „p. - -
• r h s *•: c i i s i 2er-it i-.n . ^.".ancjed * • -nata I 11 i e r c u s m . i ^ r ^ . r , 
i ~ *• . 
o-ts ent^ret} demonstrates that Appellant L juterpretatic 
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11- VT. ' value" n - i n eluding t a> : e j mbursements is harmonious with 
Clover v. Snowbird. - . :. ii^^ i.uii *- -- ^  :^  5 
^ *
 +
 estah1 'c1:^'1 . -i •- * t ne\ • t ^ contract . M the commission 
• i - " ] l i e 
* \ • ue:". aking into considerat t oi i* --levant tactois 
beari - i uvcr. ^ho rea =:•'-' =>h ! e f * • ;• •-^ -*- *al--'- "]tah Code A* i\, ^  
:..-: • , . -. A g _ r . . . . . . • : - i 
elevant factors bearing up-.ri the reasonable fa:r casr value" 
- •• -*•-'?• - • • .-^  i •: - • -: : xude a n forms oi 
cons ; derat ; (.-* . t:-,t :•—-;- [-. «.i-upaL . .-. ^  occupation taxe^- ^nr 
exarr r : e assum . no * ha • - agreement ex : sted between Appel i ant •-. : 
cons dei Appel .art r - valorem 'ax reimbursements because they 
affect Liie reasonable i d n ^ash vaJ*1^ •' ^ pr^l ''!! l -:tui *: gas. 
Because the +-a^ r^,il(Diirsement? woul . . • .• . n m 
• dbsen -r 1 '- «- ' i n. r h :i logical t assume t!,,ir. the 
~ ^ ' • * diuti u • ••* included 
whe: •• , aiK \ .i-,i . . . a- ,;^ ;i:rac+- .:ner, a 
harmonious readino oi Section ^ 9 - 5 - d"' .- .Mates thrif 
regr . • • * * >t or mi in 
the * «-;i.,e es:-i!. i shed unaej : . » .^;* > • iLicr s ->; by the 
commission analyzing a^x relevdal tactoiA, t:;u elements of 
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if AD VALOREM TAX REIMBURSEMENT PROVISIONS ARE ELEMENTS OF 
VALUE THAT WERE EXCHANGED FOR .APPELLANT'S NATURAL GAS 
tuui am >° s -1 ^ p p p l l a ^ t r e c e i v e r : * h e sale? 
„ * ,-4-c, ^ » t u i c n*F con.1 ..•:.- * * 
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p n o tcr ever' , ; • . * ^ e 
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agreements and leases. 
jrchase agreements and leases 
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IT I. TREATMENT OF TAX REIMBURSEMENTS UNDER THE NGPA DOES Nt 
PRECLUDE THEIR INCLUSION AS AN ELEMENT OF ROYALTY AND 
TAXABLE VALUE UNDER UTAH mnE ANN. §§ 59- ?;-^7 *Pd G5-
3432 i n93? *.-.,.. " -- - .* • 
whic'li •-.'/ * •- ^.arci^d i :: the ra.*. "' naturni ga: . * ^ . 7 
Llif nit- , ' jrn Q I I U W , ; 'be resiling prio t' : 
excendt-' t- - ».*- extent .leueboaiy i"° r-ecov« : • . 
' \y=- >\* * r; b^+" '-h ; • * • •* prodintion t ' ::-turai qns . . - . -,'7 
r* .;;; .. rsements rec-iv- surh treatment , ,Ct . . . .\^ i.-., 
•'• * ' :xaDie v a i u c wi^ii aeLeririini-iig s t a t e occupa t /JL 
t a x e s . 
Hoy- —. . b e c a u s e Sec t I ? - ^ ^ - i - i ^ w s t | i e maxirri,uiTi 
pi i< r I l-f.' i - , udie royalties and occupation 
t a x e s , i t d o t * * - . * i . ^ y *r-o t-her*-. ^ \xc 11J• i«= >ri 
+
 t ^ x i l ' <=> v a <<< • . • t** ' * -'.. t h a ? h e i d 
i iici . . e c t . ,i - . , < • JL t a x 
reimbursemer ' .- -« • element, oi c o n s i a e r a I ^ L >,!,UI comput 
' * ^ ^ r i a 1 -T- e l e s s D r i l l i n g C o . , l j IBLA 
' ;_ __*, ,)idiKt-:i nr.L- rci^ c > ._ 
of I n t e r i o r , I ^ ;>•;- • 9- ; arid Enron Oi- & . 
- 1 3 -
In Wheless Drilling Co., Wheless Drilling n^ » aas 
producer, appealed a deci0:'^ v * • J . *• * . ' < : ^ payments : 
roye.iv , . ; - government . . _ , * . . . . 
accn. J nc t. - el ess D: j , i , • :.. ludir.«; r t:. lue iifeiJ . n ^ 
-iA leiiubu*.'5^''^'1? m-jd- : , * he- ;as 
purchaser puj Sua, ; ^ v^it^n ae? pur i_ •__..•,-
reacted th*= -i;Hf-< lam s aiq;:n- •.: thn' federa] J oyalty payment-
' - set L1 *•":« ^v-j*- -
Powf- r Commiss i r ; . r s a n M * • W i u ; '"':::tc, A r - ? 
: ser i - * • ~ - ^ e o : 
It seems obvious to us tt lat the buy er is paying t: :> 
the seller an amount greater than the established 
field price for the natural gas it purchases from 
the #1 T.L. James well. If follows, therefore, 
that it is reasonable to compute the Federal 
royalty of the natural gas takei i from, this well on 
a M\ : t value consisting of the field price 
established by FPC plus the amount of the 
occupation taxes reimbursed by the buyer. Within 
the context of 30 CFR 221.47, "gross proceeds" 
~v ~? the established field price for the natural 
plus any additional sums paid by the purchaser 
c : the gas to the unit operatoi: as coi Isideratioi: I 
f- - -t " "iirchase of gas . . . . 
Wheless Drilling \ . 2BLA at 30. 
2Royalty payments to the federal government were determined 
pursuant to 30 CFR 221.4? which states in relevant part: "Under no 
circumstances shall the value of production of any of said 
substances for the purposes of computing royalty be deemed to be 
less than the gro^ss proceeds accruing to the'lessee from, the sale 
thereof " 
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F*- ! -• ^ . =- ^forced thi - stanc: review to 
the District .. :.^^^ • —-.—- Al-h 
Gas v. Lujan, 7~8 f .5L: ; 34 8 . • a:.-*d-
Kuvuii^ .^fc, i^ ^^ wrici*. . , i. sesseu oiu} ^  proceeds lhat 
are actually receive i Wr.at is material is what Enron 
actually receives for the gas it sells. Royalty in the 
situation before use is calculated by taking the total 
of gross proceeds for sale of product for all the 
properties plus tax reimburseinents actually received 
for all the properties, and multiplying the total by 
the applicable royalty percentage and the percentage of 
the lease total represented by the federal interest. 
That is a permissible interpretation of the statutes 
and regulations as they apply to the facts of this 
case. (emphasis added) 
: therr- s -c-: v : ^ cracker* ^n ^ I and gas 
producer, Hoover t bt._j.ui, Energies 
ppvera ! --i • nui qt leases • *• durd 1 :,•: ,!i;i i:- lands, ] \t: 
ifiai-. - - i>- '-"I He ' •«• -• -.'* ^ o the federal 
government based c\ a percentage ui tnr_- rt. ,u^, \..> value c 
<i~ ri^ ovt:^  Brackpn entered into contracts to t.»j 1 J iho 
natuidi M U S f pror|^ , H MI I I.IA IU i nil ui rsenipnt i Muses 
requiring th* }-' r ,;r \nase: • reimburse Hoover & Bracken for 
-*>" dxetD J,' > * -^ w^ r. - ; bracken paid ro\ :JI ies 
f
 - redei J vernmen . . 
"vi \ of pre ii ! latner t.ha: : - maxima:*. NGPJH price pi .-
d' 
The court reviewed the Wheless JBCIEI. , 
subsequently enacted NGPA. After ackr_own<,dg i ng the under yir,: 
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purpose of the NGPA w:.i ; ^ .lleii a - T r a d v e r s e ecor.oir.i 
f •» f f ft < t- s n f 11 i e 1 i s p a r a t e t r e a Liuen t • -1 r -: F t r < i r d i n r e r " t a n 
natuidl gas sales, t * court mncladLu t.. t-.'Lccss decis: :. i 
:; feet the NGPA'^ : •.rnost' . iiKewis«-. rhut the enacv ent 
Hoovei & Bracken, 2 3 r .-u J - ,. i: -J Marylana \ . 
Louisiana , 4" - " v< -• >'id inn *h 
: d -4 ermining royalt-€;-, tin- \ i if. ••: ja*- producti:n m c i jdeu 
t! - rice rece.,veu ioi tne ; the dmuuj , >--0^. • 
reimbursement from the purchaser. Hoover & Bracken, ; 23 F 2d at 
1492. 
W h e l u . . .__.* i_, _^v_;-_-_ _c. Jig, jici. 
r o y a l t i e s , not. tax- s, <aric nrt- - : • a J :* , : s i r u c t i v e ^lying 
t "*- -'Uional^ •'"*" t'los*'- ie-'isi^ - App^ ! 'a? * -atnot arque * -^  
from being considered ai I element of taxable value, It follows, 
therefore, tv i* *-h r '"able va - ~: +i •• • -' ' mcluv 
pricp paj.a I^J_ „.,_ _ /prv nf .jiuij. ^a. . ._ ,. amoun* : _i 
vaicjem taxes- rein.r-ursea i\ * h< aas purchasers P^urther, * ne 
NGPA . - .- > .. , 
* i* a t--a as i: • <-. Le:iieii* . LaAru .f v a ^  t,* 1 purposes . I v
 v- p u, 
occupation taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
U n d e r U t a h Code Ann . § 5 9 - 5 - 6 7, t h e a m o u n t o f 
o c . i;> -* i i o n t a x p p u ^- A p p e l l o \ t H P I o d u c t \ on -jf n a t u r a l . it _ s 
b a • . • 
p u r c h a s e / : t i.. y^ --. / ^ p p e i j a - t ^ : . n ^ r e t u t a x r e i m b u r s^ruerit -s 
a r e c r « ei>!es ^ * a K a t ' ^ - ^a 1 ! ? - v ; : t ' : i r ' > • — ari r 3 * • *^ ' J o u u 
Aim . . ., 
Thf* T e n t - , d c u . ' a s d e t e r i r ; ie * - \ d ' Mit- NGPA a ^ e s :: 
p r e c ] ii Ld€ • t i n ] i i s i o ' t a x r e i m b u r s e m e n t s i i i t h e v a ] u e of t h e 
p r o d u . L I U L v.. i id ' -uidi i uuir.. t i,;.i p u r p o s e s of c o m p u t i ng r ^ u ^ i ^ l 
r o y a . t v p a y m e n t s bpca i^ ' t 1 t h e \ ^ r> an c ^ n : -^ ' . - o n s i d e r a t i o n 
L i k e v . ' i s e , th- 'J ': / o >-.s n o : j : r> ja*i .e i i i c j u s i o t : A p p e . i a n ' f s 
1
 ^rem t a x ^ } ' r b ' j r c o ^ r ^ -- i t a x a u l t e l e m e n t u i v a l u e ^ 
d e t e i ii . , ;. ^ ^ .* • b . 
r e : : h e i c r v u v _ i. r e a s o n s , A m i e s Tax C o m r n i s s i o r 
re.= r- * ' •-, ic — : / . * * - t he p r i o r d e c i s i o n . 
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